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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 (1997), to address all the
Orders at issue in this case under Union Pacific RR Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000
UT40,^24, 999 P.2d 17.
ISSUES
First Issue: Did the Labor Commission err in dismissing the Petitioner's
death claim based upon the one year limitation period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 34A2-417(3) when the petitioner failed to file a claim until more than 3 months after the
expiration of the one year limitation period?
Standard of Review: The standard of review applicable is the correction of
error review. "If... the language [of the statute] is unambiguous and we can interpret
and apply the statutory language by the traditional methods of statutory construction,
utilizing our own expertise to decide the legislative intent, we review the agency action
under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correction of error." King v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,
850 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993).
Second Issue: Is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) unconstitutional on its
face or as applied?
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Standard of Review: Because the Utah Labor Commission is not a court of
general jurisdiction, it lacks authority to address the constitutionality of a statute. Avis v.
Board of Review. 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1992). Generally, correction of error
applies to constitutional issues when they have been addressed below. Grand County v.
Emery County. 2002 UT 57. 57 P.3d 1148.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statutes and rules are determinative in this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(5)(b)
The employer shall file the report required by Subsection (5)(a) within seven days
after:
(I) the occurrence of a fatality or injury;
(ii) the employer's first knowledge of the fatality or injury; or
(iii) the employee's notification of the fatality or injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(6)
An employer required to file a report under Subsection (5) shall provide the
employee with:
(a) a copy of the report submitted to the division; and
(b) a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's rights and
responsibilities related to the industrial injury, (emphasis added).
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3)
A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is filed within
one year of the date of death of the employee.
Utah Administrative Code R612-1-7
Upon receiving a claim for workers' compensation benefits, the insurance carrier
or self-insured employer shall promptly investigate the claim and begin payment of
compensation within 21 days from the date of notification of a valid claim or the
insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall send the claimant and the division written
notice on a division form or letter containing similar information, within 21 days of
notification, that further investigation is needed stating the reason(s) for further
investigation. Each insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall complete its
investigation within 45 days of receipt of the claim and shall commence the payment of
benefits or notify the claimant and division in writing that the claim is denied and the
reason(s) why the claim is being denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns a workers' compensation claim for death benefits. On
January 26, 2002, Henning Sven Jensen died while driving a truck for his employer,
Diamond Express, LLC on Interstate 90 near Butte, Montana. Record at 1-2, 4-9. On or
about March 8, 2002, Truck Insurance Exchange issued a written denial of workers'
compensation benefits to Vivian Jensen (the "petitioner"), spouse of Henning Sven
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Jensen, based upon the information contained in Mr. Jensen's death certificate and police
report which indicated that "heart attack" was the cause of death. Record at 27.
At about the time of the denial on March 8, 2002, the petitioner was offered and
accepted legal representation related to her workers' compensation claim and other
possible claims. Record at 51. On October 31, 2002, the petitioner was notified by her
attorneys that they had decided not to continue representing her with respect to her
claims. Record at 51. Based upon statements of her attorneys at that time, the petitioner
understood that she had no less than two years, and possibly longer, after the date of her
husband's death to proceed with her claim. Record at 52.
The petitioner eventually retained H. Dennis Piercey as legal counsel with respect
to her claims and on May 5, 2003, more than one year and three months after the date of
Henning Sven Jensen's death, the petitioner filed a Claim for Dependent's Benefits
and/or Burial Benefits. Record at 1. On June 6, 2003, the respondents filed an Answer
affirmatively alleging that Mr. Jensen died as a result of a non-industrial heart attack and
affirmatively alleging that the petitioner failed to timely file a claim for death benefits
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3), based upon the fact that the Claim for
Dependent's Benefits and/or Burial Benefits was filed more than one year from the date
of death of the deceased. Record at 44-48.
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On July 11, 2003, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the
petitioner's claim for death benefits is barred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3)
for failure to file the claim with the Labor Commission within one year. Record at 19-25.
On September 29, 2003, the petitioner filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss and conceded that the claim for benefits was not filed until approximately one
year and three months after the death of her husband. Record at 30. However, the
petitioner argued that such failure to file within the one-year statute of limitations period
should be excused based upon the following contentions: (1) the employer/carrier should
have provided the petitioner with additional documentation and advice regarding her
claims and the statute of limitations; (2) the petitioner's prior counsel failed to prosecute
her claims and failed to properly advise her of the statute of limitations; and (3) the oneyear statute of limitations is unconstitutional. Record at 30-49.
On October 2, 2003, Judge Debbie L. Hann issued an Order of Dismissal, wherein
she concluded that the petitioner's claim must be dismissed because it was not filed
within one year of the date of death as required by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3).
Record at 60-61. On October 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Review. Record
at 63. On November 13, 2003, Judge Hann signed an Order granting the respondents
until and including December 11, 2003 to file a Response to the petitioner's Motion for
Review. Record at 78. On December 11, 2003, the respondents filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Review. Record at 80.
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On April 20, 2004, the Utah Labor Commission denied petitioner's Motion for
Review stating that the statute of limitation had run, thus barring petitioner's claims.
Recordation
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The administrative law judge and the Labor Commission of Utah correctly
determined that the petitioner's claim must be dismissed pursuant to her failure to file her
claim within the one year statute period required by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-417(3). It is
undisputed that the petitioner failed to comply with the one year statute of limitations.
However, the petitioner argues that the statute of limitations should be disregarded based
upon her allegations that the respondents failed to properly assist her with her claim and
that her prior counsel provided her with erroneous advice regarding the applicable statute
of limitation. A careful review of the facts of this case demonstrates that the respondents
issued a timely written denial of the petitioner's claims and set forth the factual basis for
such denial. Record at 27.
The respondents do not have an affirmative duty to continue to assist the petitioner
with her claims or to provide her with legal advice regarding Utah workers' compensation
law. The respondents gave the petitioner timely and accurate information in compliance
with Utah's Workers' Compensation Rules. The respondents engaged in no conduct
which contributed to the petitioner's failure to comply with the statute of limitations.
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It is undisputed that after issuance of the denial, the petitioner quickly and
reasonably sought and retained counsel to give her advice and with respect to her claims.
The petitioner's prior counsel gave her erroneous information regarding the statute of
limitations. It was the erroneous advice of counsel that caused the petitioner not to file
her claim within the one year statutory period. The petitioner's proper remedy is to
pursue her legal malpractice action against her prior counsel.
Finally, petitioner's constitutional arguments against the statute of limitations set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-417(3) are without merit. The petitioner has presented
no decision by any Utah court that sets forth a constitutional prohibition on the Utah
legislature's authority and power to create such a statute of limitations. Neither can the
petitioner supply any reason for why such a limitation violates any particular provision of
the Utah or United States Constitutions. Therefore, the petitioner's constitutional
arguments should be disregarded.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Respondents Did Not Breach Any Duty to the Petitioner and Did Not Engage In
Any Conduct Which Would Justify the Requested "Exception to the Statute of
Limitations."
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) states that "[a] claim for death benefits is barred
unless an application for hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the
employee." It is undisputed that the petitioner failed to comply with the one year statute
of limitations. Therefore, the administrative law judge and the Labor Commission of
Utah correctly determined that the petitioner's claim must be dismissed.
In her Brief of Petitioner, the petitioner urges this Court to recognize a new
exception to the one year statute of limitations based upon the respondents' failure to
adequately inform the petitioner of her potential rights and responsibilities under the
statute. Specifically, the petitioner argues that she failed to file her claim within the one
year statute of limitations period because the respondents did not provide her with a
statement of rights and responsibilities and because the respondents chose to issue their
denial of the petitioner's claim on their letterhead rather than through utilization of the
Utah Labor Commission's Form 89.
A.

Petitioner's Claim That Respondents Had a Duty to Supply Her With
the Additional Form and Pamphlet Fails For Several Reasons.

There are several reasons why petitioner's claim of breach of duty fails. First,
there is no requirement in the Labor Commission rules that an employer utilize Form 89
8

for notification of a denial of the claim. Utah Administrative Code R612-1-3(E)
references Form 89 as a form which may be used by an insurance carrier or self-insured
employer to notify a claimant that her claim is denied and the reasons why the claim is
denied. However, there is no requirement in the rule that such form be used. By way of
contrast, R612-1-3 indicates that Forms 122, 221, 141, 142, 001, 025, 130, 102, 043 must
be used pursuant to the provisions of the rules. The rules do not require the use of Form
89 as the exclusive method of notifying a claimant of the denial of her claim.
Second, Utah Administrative Code R612-1-7 governs the process for acceptance
or denial of a claim. Nowhere in that rule, or any other rule, is there a requirement that an
insurance carrier utilize Form 89 to notify a claimant of its denial of the claim. Rather,
the rule requires either commencement of payment on the claim or denial of the claim "in
writing" within the 45 day period. It is undisputed that the respondents notified the
petitioner in writing of the denial of her claim along with the specific basis therefor
within the required 45 day period. Thus, the respondents breached no duty to the
petitioner with respect to their denial of the claim.
Third, in denying petitioner's request for rehearing, Utah Labor Commissioner R.
Lee Ellertson stated that Utah Administrative Code R612-1-3 does not require use of
Form 89. (See Order Denying Motion for Review, at 2). In fact, "the Industrial
Accidents Division has permitted use of other written forms of denial in the past." Id.
The Labor Commission has the power to create forms to be used in the workers'
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compensation system and has the power and discretion to determine which forms are
required and which forms are not. The Labor Commission has determined that use of the
Form 89 is not required. For this reason, the Labor Commission dismissed petitioner's
argument that failure of the respondents' use of Form 89 was sufficient to create an
exception to the one-year statute of limitations. It would be inappropriate for this Court
to make a determination with respect to which forms created by the Labor Commission
must be used. There is no rule or statute which requires the use of Form 89. Therefore,
the petitioner's argument with respect to such form should be disregarded.
Fourth, the petitioner argues that her failure to comply with the statute of
limitations was due to the respondents' alleged failure to provide her with a statement of
rights and responsibilities and that such statement would have prevented her from missing
the statute of limitations deadline. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(6) requires an employer
to provide the employee with "a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's
rights and responsibilities related to the industrial injury." The petitioner was not an
employee of Diamond Express, LLC. Rather, the petitioner was the spouse of the
deceased employee. Nothing in the language of the statute cited by the petitioner imposes
any duty upon the employer/carrier to provide the dependents of an injured or deceased
worker with a statement of employee's rights and responsibilities. Indeed, it would be
inappropriate and misleading for the employer/carrier to provide the non-employee
petitioner with such a document, which was created for injured employee workers.
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Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, even if the petitioner had been provided with
the document entitled "Employee's Guide to Workers' Compensation" and with Form 89,
there is no reference in either one of those documents to a one-year statute of
limitations. Those documents simply state that if the petitioner has any questions, the
petitioner could call the Labor Commission for further information. Nothing in Form 89
or the Employee's Guide would have called her attention to a one-year statute of
limitations for filing an application for a hearing as required by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2417(3). In fact, the petitioner would likely have been led to believe by the Employee's
Guide, which refers to the six-year statute of limitations for temporary total compensation
claims, that she had a larger amount of time to file her claim. The petitioner argues
speculatively in this appeal that this case would have had a different outcome if she had
received a Form 89 and an Employee's guide. However, because those documents do not
contain additional substantive information related to the petitioner's particular claims, it is
quite likely that she would have still retained her attorney and reached the same result
despite receipt of the document.
The petitioner concedes on page 23 of Brief of Petitioner that the Employee's
Guide refers to several time limitations, including the six-year limitation for temporary
total claims, but fails to mention the one-year limitation for death benefits claims. The
fact that the Employee's Guide makes no reference to the one-year limitation further
supports the position of the Labor Commission that the guide is intended only for
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employees and not for dependents of a deceased worker. If the Employee's Guide had
been created for such dependents, it would have included the reference to the applicable
statute of limitations for their claims.
Finally, even if it were determined that the respondents had an obligation to
provide the petitioner with a statement of employee's rights and responsibilities, Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-407 does not contain any provisions which allow for ignoring the
applicable statute of limitations when an employer neglects to provide an injured
employee with such statement. The drastic and unprecedented remedy requested by the
petitioner is not supported by the applicable statutes and should be denied and
disregarded.
The petitioner cites to numerous cases, mostly from other jurisdictions, to support
the argument that the statute of limitations should be extended in this case. However, the
cases cited by the petitioner deal with different statutory systems and none of those cases
stand for the proposition that a statute of limitations for a workers' compensation death
claim should be extended or tolled after an employer has timely denied a claim in writing
in accordance with the rules of the jurisdiction.
The petitioner cites to Fowler v. Titus Manufacturing Co., 7234 P.2d 1309 (Okla.
App. 1986) for the proposition that a statute of limitations may be tolled based upon the
conduct of an employer in a non-death case. In Fowler, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
tolled the applicable statute of limitations based upon a specific statutory provision which

12

provides for tolling of the statute of limitations if an employer neglects to advise the
employee of his right to file a workers' compensation claim. Id Oklahoma has a specific
statute which provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations. Thus, the Fowler case
is useful only in demonstrating that the Oklahoma Court of Appeals adhered to the
relevant statutes. The legislature in Utah has created no provisions regarding tolling the
statute of limitations for failure of an employer to comply with workers' compensation
rules and statutes. Additionally, the facts of the instant case demonstrate that the
respondents complied with the relevant rules and statutes by sending to the petitioner a
timely denial of the claim in writing. Therefore, the case law cited by the petitioner from
other jurisdictions involving other statutory provisions should be disregarded as factually
distinguishable from the instant case.
The petitioner also cites to Reynolds v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board.
117 Cal.Rptr. 79, 527 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1974) in support of her argument. In Reynolds,
the court noted the California statute which required an employer to provide an employee
with notice that there is a possibility of workers' compensation benefits and to provide the
employee with required language that "[i]f you wait too long, you may lose your right to
benefits." Id. at 633. The employer in that case failed to provide the employee, as
required by the statute, with language specifically referring to the potential for loss of
claims through the limitations period. As a result, the court extended the period based
upon failure to provide that required language. In the instant case, the respondents
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complied with the relevant rules by providing the petitioner a denial in writing. Utah
does not require that the employer provide the petitioner with any language or advice with
respect to the applicable statutes of limitation. The Reynolds case dealt with an entirely
different statutory scheme and should be disregarded in the resolution of the issues
presented through the petitioner's appeal.
The petitioner cites to Interstate Electric Co. V. Industrial Commission, 591 P.2d
43 6, 438 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that late notice may be excused from an
employee to an employer in a non-death case. In Interstate Electric Co., the employee
failed to give notice to the employer of an industrial accident until three days after the
date of the industrial accident because he thought that it was a minor injury from which
he would quickly recover. A statute in force in 1979 stated that if an employee failed to
notify the employer within 48 hours of the incident, the compensation would be reduced
by 15%. The court held that the notice given one day after the expiration of the period
did not prejudice the employer and that the 15% reduction should not be enforced.
The facts of the instant case are quite different from the facts of Interstate Electric
Co. In that case, the employee reported the incident within three days of the date of the
incident. That case did not involve a death. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to file
her claim for more than one year and three months subsequent to death of her husband.
The petitioner had a large amount of time within which to retain counsel, to assess the
merits of her case, and to file an Application for Hearing. The petitioner failed to take
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any action until more than three months after the expiration of the limitations period.
Therefore, her claim is barred by the statute.
The petitioner also cites to the Utah case of van der Hevde v. First Colony
Insurance Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 278-80 (Utah App. 1993) for the proposition that a
defendant may be estopped from relying on a defense as a result of its own conduct.
However, the van der Heyde case is not a workers' compensation case and does not
involve the issue of tolling of a statute of limitations defense. That case involves a
defendant's alleged violation of life insurance replacement regulations and has no
application to the instant case. Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals indicated in that
case that estoppel requires "a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party that
is inconsistent with a claim later asserted." Id at 280. The evidence in the instant case
shows that the respondents complied with all relevant statutes and administrative rules in
providing the petitioner with a timely denial of her claim. There is no evidence that the
respondents made any affirmative act or that any failure to act was inconsistent with the
petitioner's claim filed after the expiration of the one year limitations period.
As outlined above, the cases cited by the petitioner from other jurisdictions are
inapplicable in the instant case where the courts in those cases are construing statutes
which are substantially different from Utah statutes. Additionally, the petitioner has not
cited any Utah case which stands for the proposition that a statute of limitations may be
tolled even though a defendant has complied with all relevant statutory and administrative
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provisions. Therefore, the petitioner's arguments regarding an excusal for failure to
comply with the statute of limitations in this case is unsupported and should be denied.
The petitioner was made aware of the respondents' denial of her claim based upon
the information contained in the death certificate and police report which indicated that
her husband's "heart attack" was the cause of death. As a result, she nearly immediately
made the reasonable determination to contact an attorney with respect to such denial. In
retaining counsel, the petitioner was entitled to a full explanation from her attorney with
respect to her rights and responsibilities under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act. The
petitioner's quick retention of counsel demonstrates that the petitioner was not prejudiced
by any conduct of the respondents. Rather, as outlined below, the petitioner was
prejudiced solely by the conduct of her prior counsel. As such, the petitioner's remedy
should be sought through a legal malpractice action against her prior counsel.
As outlined above, there is no support for the petitioner's argument that the
respondents breached any duty to the petitioner. Even if it were determined that the
respondents breached a duty to the petitioner through failure to utilize the Form 89 and
failure to provide the petitioner with a statement of rights and responsibilities, and that the
petitioner was prejudiced thereby, there is no legal support for the argument that the
petitioner's drastic remedy would be that she has the ability to file her claim at any time
without reference to the applicable statute of limitations. R612-1-7, which governs the
procedure for acceptance and denial of a claim, sets forth no such remedy. Additionally,
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as the petitioner concedes on page 23 of Brief of Petitioner, the Employee's Guide refers
to several time limitations, including the six-year limitation for temporary total claims,
but makes no mention of the one year statute of limitations for death claims. Neither the
Employee's Guide nor Form 89 make any reference to the one year statute of limitations.
Therefore, there is no indication that the petitioner's receipt of such documents would
have yielded any different result in this case. In fact, it is likely that the referral to longer
limitations periods in the Employee's Guide would have caused the petitioner believe that
she had a longer period than one year within which to file her claim. The petitioner has
provided no legal support for the proposition that the alleged conduct of the respondents
justifies ignoring an unambiguous statute of limitation. Accordingly, the petitioner's
argument for an exception to the statute of limitations should be disregarded.
In her Brief, the petitioner makes several unfounded and outrageous allegations as
to the intentions of the respondents with respect to her claims. Indeed, the petitioner has
alleged that the employer and carrier "focused their efforts on trying to get rid of the
claim rather than on investigating it and proceeded at every turn in the way most likely to
leave Mrs. Jensen in the dark." Brief of Petitioner at 17. Additionally, the petitioner
refers to an "unbroken pattern of disregard for Mrs. Jensen's rights." Brief of Petitioner
at 30. The petitioner alleges that the respondents were "electing not to preserve evidence
directly related to the issue by requesting an autopsy." Brief of Petitioner at 22. These
allegations are offensive, without foundation in the record, and should be disregarded.
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The record demonstrates that the respondents complied with all relevant requirements
under Utah law. There is no evidence that the respondents engaged in any conduct to
deprive the petitioner of her rights.
The record demonstrates that Mr. Jensen died on the evening of January 26, 2002.
Record at 1-2. On January 31, 2002, within a few days of the accident, the petitioner had
her husband's body cremated. Record at 51. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2407(5)(b), an employer must notify the carrier and the division within seven days after the
occurrence of a fatality. Thus, the cremation occurred even before the employer was
required to report the incident to the insurance carrier. Additionally, all of the evidence
as contained in the police report and coroner's report demonstrated that Mr. Jensen died
of a heart attack. The petitioner's allegation regarding a motive of the respondents not to
preserve evidence and order an autopsy is inappropriate, wholly without support, and
should be disregarded especially in light of the fact that a cremation occurred before the
employer was even required to notify the carrier of the incident.
B.

Petitioner's Reliance on Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders, Inc. For
Support of Her Claims is Unsupported by the Facts of This Case,

The petitioner argues that the case of Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 993
P.2d 207 (Utah 2000) contains support for her argument that the statue of limitations
should be ignored in this case. In Vigos, the Utah Supreme Court held that a claim for
permanent total disability benefits filed more than six years after the industrial incident
was not barred by the statute of limitations because the employer/carrier originally
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accepted the claim as compensable, paid disability benefits, and paid medical expenses
within the six-year period. I d at 213-214. Based upon those facts, the court determined
that the Commission had original jurisdiction over the claim prior to the expiration of the
six-year statute of limitation period. Id. at 214.
As Judge Hann concluded in her October 2, 2003 Order, the facts ofVigos are
distinguishable from the instant case. In Vigos, the claim was initially accepted as
compensable, thus invoking the continuing jurisdiction provisions of the Act. The statute
of limitations was not disregarded in that case. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court
determined that the Labor Commission had gained jurisdiction over the claim prior to the
expiration of the statutory period due to the carrier's acceptance of the claim in that case.
"Because there was no dispute over compensation or medical benefits, no Commission
hearing was requested or necessary." Id at 212. In the instant case, the claim was denied
and no benefits were ever paid. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Labor Commission was
never invoked in this case prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations period and
the petitioner's claim was properly dismissed.
As outlined above, it is undisputed that the respondents provided the petitioner
with a denial of her claims within the required 45 day period and that she was made aware
that the specific basis for such denial was that the death certificate and police report
indicated that "heart attack" was the cause of her husband's death. It is also undisputed
that the petitioner quickly retained counsel to assist her with her claims but that her
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counsel failed to prosecute her claims and gave her erroneous information regarding the
applicable statute of limitations. Further, it is undisputed that the petitioner filed her
claim in this case more than one year subsequent to the death of her husband. The
petitioner has provided no persuasive legal basis for ignoring the one year statute of
limitations in this case. Under Utah law, the only exception to the one year statute of
limitation is the tolling of the statute during the period of minority of minor dependents of
the deceased worker. Bonneville Asphalt v. Labor Commission, 2004 UT App 137, 91
P.3d 849. That exception is certainly not applicable in the instant case. Accordingly,
Judge Harm's decision and the decision of Utah Labor Commissioner, R. Lee Ellertson, to
dismiss the petitioner's claim was proper and this court should not entertain petitioner's
claim for appeal of that decision.
POINT II
The Petitioner's Failure to File Her Claim Pursuant to the One-Year Statute of
Limitations in This Case Was the Result of the Petitioner's Neglect or the Result of
Erroneous Information Given to Her by Her Prior Legal Counsel.
Although the petitioner argues in her brief that her failure to comply with the
statute of limitations was the result of the conduct of the employer/carrier, the facts of this
case, demonstrate that the petitioner's failure to file a timely Application for Hearing was
not the result of any conduct by the respondents. As outlined above, the respondents
complied with all applicable requirements and provided the petitioner with a timely denial
under the rules. It is unclear why no action was taken until more than one year and three
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months after the industrial incident. The responsibility to file a timely Application for
Hearing clearly lies with the petitioner. It is certainly not the responsibility of an
employer or insurance carrier to give legal advice to the spouse of a deceased
worker-especially where that individual has retained legal counsel. The petitioner's
claim in this appeal is essentially an attempt to shift the responsibility for compliance with
the statute of limitations from herself to the respondents. However, it appears that the
petitioner's failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitation was either the result
of her own delay or was the result of incorrect legal advice given by her prior counsel.
At about the time of the denial on March 8, 2002, the petitioner was offered and
accepted legal representation related to her workers' compensation claim and other
possible claims. (See Affidavit of Vivian Jensen ^f 8, Record at 52). On October 31,
2002, the petitioner was notified by her attorneys that they had decided not to continue
representing her with respect to her claims. (See Affidavit of Vivian Jensen % 9, Record
at 52). Based upon statements of her attorneys at that time, the petitioner understood that
she had no less than two years, and possibly longer, after the date of her husband's death
to proceed with her claim.1 ( I d at f 10, Record at 52). As a result of this counsel, the

1

The petitioner now argues on page 19 of the Brief of Petitioner that the record is
unclear as to what the petitioner was told from prior counsel. Respondents refer this
Court to paragraph 10 of the Affidavit of Vivian Jensen which states, "Based on
statements of my attorneys in connection with their decision not to proceed, I understood
that I had no less than two years, and possibly longer, after the date of Henning's death to
proceed with my claim." Record at 52. This assertion of the petitioner unambiguously
establishes that she understood from her prior counsel that she had at least two years
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petitioner failed to file an Application for Hearing until more than three months after the
expiration of the one year limitation period.
The petitioner argues that her claim should be allowed to survive the one year
statute of limitations based upon her prior counsel's failure to proceed with her claim for
benefits and his failure to correctly advise her of the statute of limitations. However,
although this argument is frequently made in cases involving dismissals resulting from
missed deadlines and statutes of limitations, courts have consistently held that failure of
counsel does not justify reinstating claims for such missed deadlines.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently dealt with and resolved the issues
presented by the petitioner in her Motion for Review. In Gripe v. City of Enid,
Oklahoma. 312 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2002), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with the issue of whether to reinstate a plaintiffs claims, which had been dismissed due
to the plaintiffs attorney's failure to comply with deadlines. The Tenth Circuit declined
to reverse the judge's dismissal of the claims on that basis stating that "[a] litigant is
bound by the actions of its attorney, and the relative innocence in the failure does not
constitute grounds for relief." Id at 1188-89. In support of its holding, the court further
stated:

before the statute of limitations would run. The petitioner's new argument that the record
is not clear as to whether her prior counsel gave incorrect advice regarding the statute of
limitations is disingenuous and contrary to her sworn affidavit contained in the Record at
52.
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Plaintiff argues against the harshness of penalizing him for his attorney's
conduct. But there is nothing novel here. Those who act through agents are
customarily bound by their agents' mistakes. It is no different when the
agent is an attorney. (It should be noted, however, that the mistreated client
is not totally without a remedy. There may be a meritorious malpractice
claim against the attorney.) Id at 1189.
Thus, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that the appropriate remedy for a litigant whose
attorney has missed deadlines is not revival of the dismissed claim, but a legal
malpractice claim against the attorney.
The United States Supreme Court has also addressed and resolved the issues raised
by the petitioner in this appeal. In Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386,
8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962), the Court faced the issue of whether to reinstate the plaintiffs
claims, which had been dismissed as a result of the plaintiffs attorney's failure to comply
with deadlines. In response to this issue, which is identical to the issues raised by the
petitioner in this appeal, Justice Harlan indicated:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's
claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust
penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his
representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of
the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would
be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which
each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent. Id. at 633-34.
Justice Harlan further explained:
[A] civil plaintiff may be deprived of his claim if he failed to see to it that
his lawyer acted with dispatch in the prosecution of his lawsuit. And if an
attorney's conduct falls substantially below what is reasonable under the
circumstances, the client's remedy is against the attorney in a suit for
malpractice. But keeping this suit alive merely because plaintiff should not
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be penalized for the omissions of his own attorney would be visiting the
sins of the plaintiffs lawyer upon the defendant. Id. at 634, n.10.
Based upon these considerations, the United States Supreme Court held that a claimant's
dismissed claim should not be revived based upon the failures of that claimant's attorney.
The facts of the instant case demonstrate that the petitioner's prior counsel
erroneously told her that she could file her claim within two years of her husband's death.
It seems clear that it was this erroneous representation to the petitioner by her prior
counsel that caused the petitioner not to file her claim within the one year statutory
period. However, this issue has been addressed and resolved by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Pursuant 1o the holdings of those
courts, a claimant's failure of counsel does not constitute justification for revival of a
claim dismissed for failure to prosecute a claim or failure to comply with deadlines.
Accordingly, Judge Hann's order and the order from the Utah Labor Commission
dismissing the petitioner's claims was consistent with established law and should be
upheld.
POINT III
The Petitioner's Constitutional Arguments Do Not Find Support Under Utah Law.
The Petitioner argues that Constitutional issues need not be reached in this case
because the Petitioner should be entitled to benefits due to failures of the employer, the
carrier, and her prior counsel. However, the Petitioner implies in the Brief of Petitioner
that Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) violates Utah's Open Courts Clause found in Utah
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Const, art. I, § 11 and the uniform operation of laws provision found in Utah Const, art. I,
§ 24. The Respondents concur with the petitioner that the Constitutional issues need not
be reached in this case. Additionally, the petitioner has failed to offer any argument or
case law sufficient to overcome the presumption that the one year statute of limitation is
constitutionally valid.
Under Utah law, a statute is presumed constitutional and reasonable doubts are
resolved in favor of constitutionality. Utah School Boards Ass'n v. Utah State Bd. Of
Educ. 2001 UT 2, 17 P.3d 1125; State v. DeBoov. 2000 UT 32, 996 P.2d 546 (stating
that legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and will not
be declared unconstitutional unless there is no real basis upon which they can be
construed as conforming to constitutional requirements); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234
(Utah 1998)(stating that a party mounting a constitutional challenge to a law bears a
heavy burden to overcome the presumption that the law is valid, with any reasonable
doubts resolved in favor of constitutionality); State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500
(stating that when addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute, the Utah Court of
Appeals presumes that the statute is valid and resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality).
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the legislature's judgment in
fixing length of a limitations period is accorded great latitude under the provisions of the
Utah Constitution. Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993). With respect to statutes of
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limitations, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that state legislatures possess discretion
to enact statutes of limitations, and these statutes are presumptively constitutional. Avis
v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n. 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992).
The respondents emphasize that Utah appellate courts have decided that workers'
compensation statutes of limitation do not violate the open courts provision of the Utah
Constitution, or equal protection. See Avis v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992). In Avis, the Utah Court of Appeals
analyzed a case involving a workers' compensation statute of limitation. See Id. at 587.
In that case, this court stated that "'a statute of limitations is constitutionally sound if it
should allow a reasonable, not unlimited, time in which to bring suit.'" IcL (quotation
omitted). What is to be considered a reasonable time must be decided by the legislature,
and courts will not inquire into the wisdom of such time period unless it is manifestly so
insufficient that the statue becomes a denial of justice. See id. Moreover, the court
pointed out that courts have long recognized exceptions to alleviate the harsh effects of
statutes of limitations, but those exceptions involve cases where "'plaintiffs] had no way
of knowing the injury had occurred until after the statute had run and therefore no way of
affixing or exploring potential liability within the statutory period.'" Id. (quotation
omitted). Those exceptions do not apply in this case. Indeed, the petitioner was aware of
the occurrence of the death and retained counsel to explore potential liability within the
statutory period.
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The petitioner argues that there can be no legitimate governmental interest for a
one-year statute of limitations for death claims as opposed to longer limitations periods
for different types of claims. However, death claims are quite different from other
workers' compensation claims. A death claim has a definite and certain date of
occurrence while other types of occupational disease and repetitive trauma claims may
involve some ambiguity as to the date upon which the statutory period begins to run.
When a worker dies, the interested parties become aware of that fact and can immediately
begin to assess the claim and explore the possibility or need to pursue a claim.
Additionally, dependents of a deceased worker are an entirely different class of
individuals than injured workers.
The one-year period for death claims does not involve the scenario discussed by
the Utah Supreme Court wherein plaintiffs have no way of knowing the injury had
occurred until after the statute had run and therefore no way of affixing or exploring
potential liability within the statutory period. Avis, 837 P.2d at 587. Indeed, the record in
this case clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was aware of the death of her husband
and immediately retained counsel after receiving notification of the denial of her claim.
There is a legitimate governmental interest in prescribing a one-year statute of limitations
for death claims where such claims lack any ambiguity as to the date of the death.
Additionally, the evidence demonstrates that the petitioner was aware of her husband's
death and had ample time within the statutory period to explore potential liability.

27

Therefore, the petitioner has provided no sufficient argument or case law to demonstrate
that the one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional on its face or as applied.
The petitioner cites to the recent case of Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91 (November
5, 2004) in support of her constitutional argument. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court
dealt with the constitutionality of the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap.
That case makes no reference to the constitutionality of any statute of limitations and is
inapplicable to the case at hand.
The petitioner also cites to In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074
in support of the argument that a one-year statute of limitations is too short. However, the
one-year limitation addressed in that case which required that the determination or
establishment of a marriage must occur during the relationship or within one year
following the termination of that relationship. IdL At 1077. The Utah Supreme Court in
that case declined to address the constitutional issues raised and determined that the
statutory section only required the filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within
one year after the termination of the relationship. Id. at 1081. As in In re Marriage of
Gonzalez, there is no reason for this Court to address the constitutionality of the one-year
statute in this case, which is presumed to be constitutional. Additionally, the holding in
that case supports the legitimacy of requiring the filing of a petition or Application for
Hearing within a one-year period. Therefore, the petitioner's arguments regarding the
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constitutionality of the one-year statute in this case should be disregarded and the decision
of the Labor Commission should be affirmed.
The petitioner has not provided any case law or argument sufficient to overcome
the presumption of constitutionality with respect to the one year statute of limitations.
The constitutionally valid one-year statute of limitations imposed on claims for death
benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-417(3) provides a bar to Petitioner's
Application for Hearing and her claims were, thus, properly dismissed.
Point IV
The Petitioner's Argument Regarding the Merits and Substance of the Underlying
Death Benefits Claim Should Be Disregarded Where The Labor Commission
Dismissed the Petitioner's Claim Prior to Any Evidentiary Hearing or
Determination on the Merits,
In her Brief of Petitioner, the Petitioner argues that the dismissal of her claim
should be reversed based upon the fact that her husband's death was a compensable
industrial injury. In the Brief, the Petitioner offers highly detailed "facts" related to the
truck accident which have never been established before the Utah Labor Commission
because the case was dismissed for failure to comply with the statute of limitation. As
outlined above, Mr. Jensen's death certificate and the police report from the truck
accident indicated that "heart attack" was the cause of Mr. Jensen's death. Based upon
that evidence, the petitioner's claim was denied. The petitioner quickly retained counsel
and was advised by such counsel that she had two years within which to file her claim.
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As a result her prior counsel's lack of familiarity with Utah law, the petitioner failed to
file her Application for Hearing within the required period.
Due to the fact that the petitioner failed to comply with the statute of limitation,
her case was dismissed prior to a hearing or determination on the merits. It is
procedurally inappropriate for the petitioner to now offer "facts" related to the truck
accident which never became evidence or part of the record in this case and to argue that
benefits are due. Respondents respectfully request that the petitioner's argument with
respect to the merits of the underlying case be disregarded. The proper issue before this
Court is whether the administrative law judge and the Utah Labor Commission correctly
dismissed the petitioner's case where the undisputed facts demonstrated that she did not
file her Application for Hearing until more than three months after the expiration of the
limitation period. As outlined above, the determinations made below were consistent
with clearly established Utah law and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that the petitioner failed to file her Application for Hearing until
more than three months subsequent to the expiration of the one year period set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3). As a result, the petitioner requests that this Court create
a new exception for her failure to comply with a statute of limitations. However, the
petitioner has not cited to any cases in Utah or any other jurisdiction to support an
exception to a statute of limitations in a workers' compensation death case where the
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employer/carrier has complied with all statutory requirements. The petitioner argues that
her failure to comply with the statute of limitations was the fault of the employer for
issuing the written notice of denial in letter form instead of using a Labor Commission
form and for failing to give her the Employee's Guide. The petitioner speculatively
argues that she would have somehow become aware of the one year statute of limitations
if she had received these forms. However, as outlined above, none of the forms identified
by the petitioner contain any reference whatsoever to a one-year statute of limitations for
death claims. Additionally, as outlined above, there is no requirement that an employer or
carrier use a Labor Commission form to issue a denial of a claim and there is no
requirement to give an Employee's Guide to the spouse of a deceased worker. Thus, the
respondents did not breach any duty to the petitioner in this case and the petitioner's
failure to comply with the statute of limitations should not be excused. There is no
evidence that the petitioner was improperly prejudiced in any way by the conduct of the
respondents. In fact, the petitioner sought counsel immediately after receiving notice of
the denial with the expectation that her retained counsel would provide her with the legal
expertise to protect her rights. Unfortunately, the petitioner's counsel did not provide her
with accurate advice regarding her claim.
The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that the petitioner's failure to
comply with the statute of limitations was the result of either her own neglect or apathy,
or by the erroneous advice given by her prior counsel. The petitioner relied upon her
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counsel's representation that she had two years after the industrial incident to file an
Application for Hearing. As outlined above, courts have consistently held that ineffective
assistance of counsel is not a justification for disregarding a failure to comply with a
statute of limitations. The petitioner's remedy and proper course of action is to assert a
malpractice claim against her prior counsel.
Additionally, the petitioner has not satisfied her burden to establish that the one
year statute of limitation violates any particular constitutional provision on its face or as
applied to her particular situation. The statute is presumed constitutional under Utah law
and the petitioner has provided no legitimate basis to rebut that presumption.
In sum, the issues raised in the Brief of Petitioner have already been decided by
two adjudicatory bodies. Those issues do not present any ambiguity as to the application
of the law. Therefore the determination of the Labor Commission dismissing the
petitioner's claim should be affirmed.
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